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In search of an answer, this book asks whether the demands of national security undermine the integrity of liberty and weaken, perhaps irreparably, the values associated with it. The dependence of liberty on security policy became a matter of intense public debate in the late 1890s as the 
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United States engaged in its first imperial exploits outside the boundaries of North America. Symbolically arrayed on the opposite sides of the issue were two of the more formidable personalities of the day: the arch-expansionist Theodore Roosevelt and the avowed anti-imperialist Mark Twain. At the center of that heated struggle over empire was the question of how, or perhaps whether, traditional American values fit into a modernizing society that was increasingly global in its material ambitions. The emergence at that time of a novel, ultimately ingrained way of thinking about security -herein termed an ethos -among authorities and, increasingly, a public attuned to international affairs gave the question its vitality. Within two generations, this security ethos was taking precedence over individual rights and liberties whenever real or perceived threats to the nation appeared.
3 The extent to which American distinctiveness -cast throughout the nation's history as "American exceptionalism" -did or did not survive these various crises into the twenty-first century is an underlying concern of my study. Hunt presents a typology identifying a national mission to promote liberty, the conundrum of race as a factor in the making of foreign policy, and a profound aversion to revolution as the most crucial determinants of policy. He has recently explored America's swift rise to global dominance, hegemony rather than empire in his telling, finding that a "union of wealth, confidence, and leadership provides the basis for sustained international 3 Influential for framing the idea of a security ethos was Richard J. Barnet It is my contention that too many books concerning the early Cold War and U.S. foreign relations suffer from a debilitating liability: They are surprisingly ahistorical in both concept and exposition.
7 According to these books, the world and thus history, too, essentially began anew after World War II. As a result, an emphasis on state-to-state relations trumps other plausible ways of conceptualizing and writing history. That is, I submit, like calling oneself a geologist without examining anything more revealing than topographical maps; one has a general idea about what the earth looks like, but knows scarcely anything about its complex subsoil composition. The past therefore nearly becomes anathema to the present, in this case to informed scrutiny of the roots of American foreign policy.
A number of questions lie at the heart of my critique of Cold War scholarship and its uneasy relationship with the past. Could modern history be understood only through a so-called realist lens focused on a presumptive Soviet challenge to American national interests? What precisely were those interests? Had they sprung from nothing? Or did U.S. policy reflect the contours of American history, to borrow a phrase from Williams?
8 Melvyn P. Leffler, some of whose work I have criticized, has written that the Truman administration formulated national security policy with an eye to protecting America's core values. 14 Hoff writes that "the United States was born in a fit of self-determination." That did not necessarily make for a responsible foreign policy. She briefly surveys American diplomacy since independence, noting that the fact of "[s]elf-determined, but not necessarily democratic, self-government . . . lay at the heart of its . . . drive to become the example for how the rest of the world should operate."
15 Woodrow Wilson transformed the ideal of self-determination into a universal guiding principle in foreign policy. Whether it actually fostered democracy was another matter.
xiii My rather disappointing encounter with Cold War scholarship has led me to pose the questions asked previously and raise others about values, interests, and American history that inform this study: What, for instance, has been the relationship between American core values and U.S. security policy? Did the republic, in becoming an imperial power in the 1890s, retain a capacity to protect the principles that made it distinctive commencing in the colonial era? Did the many individuals who presided over the growth of America's global power incorporate core values into their understanding of the nation's security? Can basic values, rights, and liberties, having been compromised in the name of security throughout modern American history, endure in the twenty-first century? Finding answers for these questions traces back to the colonial era.
A project of this scope, particularly one so long in the making, owes a lot to many people -some for their inspiration, others for the assistance they gave in a variety of ways. At Cambridge University Press, Lew Bateman, with whom I have worked for years, and especially Eric Crahan and Emily Spangler, who saw the book to publication, were marvelous editors. I thank, too, the readers for the Press; their splendid efforts helped make the book what it now is.
There are many others to thank. Father Robert Luchi showed me in high school at St. Charles in Columbus, Ohio, how passionate the study of history could be. At Ohio State University, no one was more helpful than John C. Rule; with a few kind words, he rescued me from law school. I would never have studied American foreign relations were it not for David Green and Marvin Zahniser. To this day, I recall with fondness the long conversations about history and the state of the world with Mark Rose and Mel Leffler. And thanks to Marvin, I did my doctoral work with Alexander DeConde at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Alex always supported the breadth of my interests, and I deeply thank him for that.
I was fortunate to have a somewhat peripatetic career. At California State University, Sacramento, one of the first persons I met was the noweminent historian of the American West, Al Hurtado, then an MA student. At Rancho Ben Ali, in Rio Linda, or on camping trips high in the Sierra mountains, we talked endlessly about history. Those conversations continue to this day. Working as one of two American historians for sixteen years at Ohio Wesleyan University allowed me to continue to read and teach broadly as my research became more specialized. Two of my students there, Bob Buzzanco and Peter Hahn, were a joy to work with; they have my admiration for the ways in which they took on the study of history as their life's work. In my time at Florida International University in Miami, we had a marvelous, young department. The hours spent talking history and politics with Alex Lichtenstein and Clarence Taylor influenced portions of this book. At the University of Toronto, I would not have had the rewarding teaching experiences I did without the efforts of Bob Bothwell, Carol Chin,
